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Abstract
This article examines an intra- and international trust 
game experiment between Moroccan, French and 
Spanish participants. Before making decisions, the par-
ticipants knew the nationality of their partner. We find 
that, on average, subjects from Morocco exhibit a higher 
level of trust. Furthermore, they trust French more than 
Spanish subjects. Regarding reciprocity, subjects from 
Spain were the least trustworthy. Additionally, we do not 
observe country differences in reciprocal behaviour.
Keywords
Cross-country; Experiment; Reciprocity; Trust; Trust 
game. 
Resumen
Este artículo examina un experimento internacional 
basado en el juego de la confianza entre participantes 
marroquíes, franceses y españoles. Antes de tomar de-
cisiones, los participantes conocían la nacionalidad de 
su pareja. Nuestros resultados muestran que, en prome-
dio, los sujetos de Marruecos presentan un mayor nivel 
de confianza. Además, confían más en los participantes 
franceses que en los españoles. En cuanto al comporta-
miento recíproco, los sujetos españoles fueron los me-
nos fiables. Cabe destacar también que no observamos 
diferencias entre países en cuanto a la reciprocidad.
Palabras Clave
Confianza; Experimento; Juego de la confianza; Multi-
países; reciprocidad.
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introduction
A large part of the total population of Moroccans 
(approximately 5m out of 38m) lives abroad. Among 
these, over 1.5m live in France and 0.8m in Spain. It 
has often been argued that, due to a variety of rea-
sons, Moroccan emigrants in these two Eu countries 
have been economically and socially discriminated 
in comparison to other, equally qualified workers 
from the Eu. The ongoing debate concerning the 
integration of non-Eu immigrants into the societies 
of host Eu countries makes the case of Moroccan 
immigrants a very interesting case study, among 
other reasons, because the experience from the con-
tact between immigrant and native host populations 
shapes their attitudes towards each other. Following 
Smith’s (2010) insightful review on trust across ra-
cially different populations, people belonging to dis-
criminated minorities may eventually mistrust others. 
Empirical studies based on surveyed respond-
ent’s stated beliefs concerning the trustworthiness 
of “others” uniquely address the degree to which a 
person trusts another, where lacking the ability to 
control for the “other’s” trustworthiness is under-
stood as behaviour reciprocal to the trust received. 
Recently, the experimental paradigm has been used 
to address both trust and reciprocity in economic 
contexts (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) within and 
across culturally homogeneous groups (Fershtman 
and Gneezy 2001; Barr 2005). As a result of con-
tinuing economic, political and social globalisation, 
economic interactions increasingly take place not 
only within particular cultures, but also between in-
dividuals from different cultures. The prospects for 
this type of international economic integration may 
depend, among other things, on cultural factors. 
Guiso et al. (2006), for example, showed that foreign 
direct investment and trade of goods and services, 
as well as portfolio investment at the national level, 
are affected by the prevailing attitudes citizens have 
towards a partner country.
The objective of this paper is to investigate trust-
ing and reciprocating behaviour at the intra- and 
international levels. In particular, we focus on three 
Mediterraneanneighbour countries: Morocco, France 
and Spain. The three countries are located in geo-
graphically proximate areas. Spain shares a border 
with France, whereas the border between Spain and 
Morocco (fourteen kilometres across the sea at the 
nearest point and land borders in the Spanish cities 
of Ceuta and Melilla on the African continent) is one 
of the most unequal in terms of GDP among all the 
OECD countries. Moreover, during part of the twenti-
eth century (from 1912 to 1956) Morocco became a 
protectorate of both France (most of the country) and 
Spain (some northern and southern zones). From the 
international trade perspective, France is Morocco’s 
largest trading partner, followed by Spain; while Mo-
rocco is a marginal trading partner for the two Eu-
ropean countries. Concerning the trade relations be-
tween France and Spain, they are less asymmetric 
than those of any of the two with Morocco: Spain 
stands as France’s fourth trade partner, while France 
is the country with the largest weight in Spanish ex-
ternal trade (CEPII 2011). Therefore, their narrow 
commercial relationships, historical ties and cultural 
diversity make them an interesting case study.
The three countries have some significant differ-
ences. Morocco is a developing African country in 
which Muslims make up a majority of the population, 
whereas France and Spain are developed European 
countries with a majority of Catholics. According to 
the IMF (2013), France and Spain are ranked 24th 
and 28th in terms of GDP per capita, while Morocco 
ranks 114th. In this sense, France and Spain consti-
tute the high-income countries of our sample, while 
Morocco may be classified as a low-income country.
Another interesting distinction among these coun-
tries that could influence their behaviour is the way 
in which people interact within the society and with 
those from other societies. Concerning the inter-
dependence within a society, Hofstede (2009) pro-
posed an individualism index that reflects how peo-
ple look after themselves and their direct family only. 
According to this index, Morocco’s individualism in-
dex is lower than those of France and Spain.1 With 
regard to trust in other societies, the World Values 
Survey (WVS hereafter) Wave 5 measures the ex-
tent to which people trust others of another nationali-
ty. Compared to France (27.8%) and Spain (6.3%), a 
lower ratio of respondents in Morocco (1.8%) chose 
the answer “Trust completely”. Similarly, a higher ra-
tio (31.6%) of Moroccan respondents chose the an-
swer “No trust at all” (compared to 13.1% in Spain 
and 5.7% in France).2 These results seem to indicate 
that people from Morocco are less willing to trust 
people of another nationality than are Spanish and 
French respondents. Indeed, according to the WVS, 
in an index ranging from -100 (no trust at all) to +100 
(trust completely), France obtains +56, Spain -1 and 
Morocco -55.
We follow the experimental design of Bohnet and 
zeckhauser (2004) using a modified version of the 
trust game by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). 
Over the last two decades, the trust game has been 
widely used to experimentally measure trust and 
trustworthiness around the world. Our paper is re-
lated to the literature that investigates trust and reci-
procity at the intra-national and international levels. 
For instance, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) identi-
fied ethnic stereotypes to be the cause of discrimina-
tion in the Israeli Jewish society towards subjects of 
Eastern origin. Willinger et al. (2003) found that the 
amount that Germans invested in France is higher 
than that invested by French people in Germany; 
however, the amount that Germans return to the 
French is not different from the amount the French 
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return to Germans. In their study on Turkish and 
Belgian small businessmen, Bouckaert and Dhaene 
(2004) found that trust and reciprocity do not depend 
on the ethnic origin of the trust donor or on the ethnic 
origin of the receiver. Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2008) 
implemented an intercultural trust game experiment 
between Germans, Israelis and Palestinians. They 
found that Israeli senders make lower transfers (to 
all subjects) and, in contrast, Palestinian senders 
make high transfers. Bornhost et al. (2010) ran an 
experiment in which students of different European 
nationalities were divided into five-member groups 
and had to repeatedly choose with whom, within their 
group, they would like to play a trust game. They 
found that participants tend to trust those they trusted 
before and who trusted them. They did not find evi-
dence of regional discrimination per se. Finally, Akai 
and Netzer (2012) found that the intra-national trust 
levels in Japan and Austria are identical. However, 
while the international trust for Japanese groups is 
lower than that of Austrian groups, the international 
reciprocity for Japanese groups is greater than that 
of Austrian groups. 
Regarding African countries, Johnson and Mislin 
(2011) conducted a meta-analysis for a large sam-
ple of trust game results in order to identify, among 
other issues, the effect of geographic variation on 
this behavioural measure of trust and trustworthi-
ness. The authors found evidence that subjects send 
less in trust games conducted in Africa than those 
run in North America.3 Additionally, Burns (2006) ex-
amined the impact of racial identity on behaviour in 
trust games played by high school students in South 
Africa. The study found a systematic pattern of dis-
trust towards Black partners, even by Black propos-
ers. According to Burns (2006), these results reflect 
the impact of socio-economic inequality rather than 
ethnic differences on subject behaviour. Similarly, 
Ashraf et al. (2006) found that Black players receive 
and make lower offers than whites or coloured in the 
trust game, even when playing with members of their 
own ethnicity. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ex-
perimental trust game that directly examines wheth-
er the trade relationship between Morocco and its 
two historical neighbours and partners, Spain and 
France, is reflected in the levels of trust and reci-
procity among them.
Overall, our results show that participants from Mo-
rocco exhibited the highest level of trust and reciproc-
ity, whereas participants from Spain the lowest ones. 
These results suggest that there is a connection be-
tween reciprocal and trusting behaviour. To some ex-
tent, individuals expect that other participants from 
other countries behave like they do. In this sense, 
the high (low) level of trust observed with Moroccan 
(Spanish) might be explained by the high (low) level 
of reciprocity exhibited by their compatriots. 
Regarding the importance of historical and trade 
relationships on levels of trust and reciprocity in bi-
lateral relations, we do not observe positive discrimi-
nation towards participants from their own country 
either in trust or reciprocal behaviour in any coun-
try. Finally, we find that Moroccan subjects display a 
higher level of trust for French than for Spanish ones. 
However, we do not find evidence of discrimination 
among countries as far as reciprocal behaviour is 
concerned.
experimental design and 
procedures
Following the game introduced by Bohnet and 
zeckhauser (2004), we focus on a binary-choice, 
two-player trust game in which the principal has to 
choose between x and Y. x results in a certain out-
come, whereas Y may yield the principal either a 
higher (Option 1) or a lower payoff (Option 2) than 
option x.
In this game, choosing Y means the principal allows 
the agent to determine the principal’s (hereafter, player 
A) earnings and those of the agent (hereafter, player 
B). Figure 1 presents the binary-choice trust game.
Figure 1.
Binary-choice trust-game.
A money-maximizing player B would prefer 22 
monetary units to 15. If player A considers that player 
B will behave in this way, player Ashould choose the 
certain alternative (x), therefore receiving 10 rather 
than 8 monetary units. This is the Perfect Nash Equi-
librium of the game. However, player A may con-
sider that player B has other-regarding preferences 
and would act reciprocally. In this case, player A 
may choose the trusting alternative (Y) if he/she ex-
pects—if not with certainty at least with a sufficiently 
high probability—that player B will choose the egali-
tarian outcome (15, 15).
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The binary-choice trust-game experiment was run 
in three different countries: France, Morocco and 
Spain. A total of 180 university students participated 
in the experiment: 60 students from each country 
(university of Granada, Spain; university of Rabat, 
Morocco; university of Paris, France). Any Spanish, 
Moroccan or French participant played the binary-
choice trust game with one member of his/her own 
country as well as with one member of the other two 
countries. All matchings were played one-shot. The 
type of design we used raises the issue of possible 
order effects. In order to avoid order effects in the 
decision-making, we collected data using random or-
dering. That is, the order of matching across subject 
pools was completely random. All participants knew 
the university of origin of the participant with whom 
they were paired. Participants kept their player type 
throughout the experiment. 
In each country, the instructions of the experiment 
were read aloud and explained in detail to the experi-
mental subjects by a native research assistant. To 
ensure that the subjects understood the instructions, 
they were asked to answer a questionnaire after the 
instructions had been read aloud to the group and 
just before the experiment began. All of the subjects 
answered the questions correctly.
Participants played the game against a counter-
part from each subject pool without being informed 
about their earnings from the game before the very 
end of the entire experiment. Subjects made their de-
cisions in complete anonymity.
The strategy method (Selten 1967) allowed us to 
elicit decisions from player B independently from the 
decisions of player A. By having player B state his 
decision in the case that player A chose the trust-
ing alternative, the sequential two-person, two-stage 
game is converted into a two-person, normal-form, 
one-stage game for each player. These correlated 
games can be played independently at different lo-
cations and different points in time. The experiment 
was run using pen and paper. This procedure made 
the experimental design independent of equipment 
and ensured software compatibility across countries. 
In each of the three countries, we ran two sessions 
with 30 participants for each player type. 
Participants in each country randomly drew a per-
sonal identification code constituting a predefined or-
der of matching across subject pools not noticeable 
for participants. The code also ensured full anonym-
ity by a double-blind procedure. Subjects then made 
their choices on decision sheets marked with their 
code number and displaying their counterpart’s coun-
try. Once all sessions were completed everywhere, 
the experimenters collected the data, computed the 
payoffs and transferred this information to all the ex-
perimenters in the other countries. Finally, subjects 
were paid out by the local experimenters a week after 
the end of the last session.
Sessions lasted for about 40 minutes including 
the reading of the instructions. On average, subjects 
earned €14.
The international character of this research war-
ranted that we control for country- or culture-specific 
variables that could influence our results. Specifical-
ly, we addressed the following issues as suggested 
by Roth et al. (1991).
a) Controlling for subject pool equivalency. Sub-
jects were all undergraduate students and were 
paid for their earnings in the experiment.
b)	 Controlling	 for	 currency	 effects.	 We controlled 
for purchasing power parity by choosing de-
nominations such that monetary incentives rela-
tive to subject income and living standards were 
approximately equal across countries (as in 
kachelmeier and Shehata 1992). The exchange 
rates were: 1 experimental point = €1 in France 
and Spain; and 1 experimental point = 10 dir-
hams in Morocco.
c)	 Controlling	for	language	effects.	To control for any 
nuances in language which may impact results 
across countries, the instructions for the experi-
ments were translated into the native language.4
d)	 Controlling	 for	 experimenter	 effects.	 Vari-
ous measures were taken to control for differ-
ences among the experimenters in the differ-
ent countries. First, in each country, the lead 
experimenter was a native professor from that 
country. Second, an extremely thorough experi-
mental protocol was used in all three countries. 
Finally, an experimenter was present in the data 
recording room while each experiment was be-
ing conducted.
e) Controlling for comprehension of the experi-
mental task. To ensure that the subjects in each 
country understood the experimental task after 
reading through the instructions, the subjects 
completed a series of comprehension checks 
prior to engaging in the actual task. The experi-
ment monitors checked each student’s answers 
before the experiment was allowed to proceed.
As regards the composition of the sample, some 
tables to describe the main characteristics of re-
spondents by country and for the whole sample are 
included in the appendix. All the subjects were uni-
versity students. Therefore, they were all older than 
18 and most of them had completed 1-4 years of edu-
cation after undergraduate school. Concerning reli-
gion, almost all the respondents from Morocco were 
Muslim, two-thirds of Spanish respondents were 
Catholic and the others indicated they were non-reli-
gious. More heterogeneity was found in France, with 
approximately one quarter of subjects being Catholic, 
one quarter Muslim and less than half non-religious. 
Finally, the sample was balanced in terms of gender.
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results
We first analyze players A’s decisions and subse-
quently focus on players B’s decisions. We denote 
the trusting alternative of player A as “trust” and the 
egalitarian option of player B as “reciprocity”.
a) players a’s decisions: trusting behaviour
First, we examine whether subjects from each of 
the three countries made different trusting choices 
regardless of their partner’s country. Figure 2 shows 
the percentage of players A trusting players B for 
each country.5 As can be observed, on average, Mo-
roccan subjects exhibited the highest level of trust-
ing: 56% of Moroccan subjects trusted, while only 
43% and 37% respectively of French and Spanish 
subjects did.6
To check whether these differences are significant, 
we performed an econometric exercise. We estimat-
ed an ordered probit model to explain the number of 
times each subject trusts (the variable TRUSTSUM 
can take a value from 0 to 3) by a set of individu-
al characteristics and the subject’s country of resi-
dence. Each column displays the results of the same 
model but the omitted dummy indicating the subject’s 
residence differs from one column to another in order 
to control for any possible country-pair specificities. 
The results displayed in Table 1 confirm the results 
in Figure 2. We do find a significant impact of the 
country of residence: participants from France and 
Spain display a significantly lower level of trust than 
Moroccan subjects (column 1) and reciprocal, Moroc-
can display a higher level of trust than French sub-
jects (column 2) and Spanish subjects (column 3). 
This finding leads to our first result.
Result 1: Subjects from Morocco exhibit a higher level 
of trust than subjects from France and Spain.
The results also contain another important mes-
sage since we do not find any significant effect of 
subject characteristics (age, gender and religion). 
Obviously, the size of the sample is not large enough 
to consider extrapolating any conclusions but indi-
cates that trust in different cultures and/or nationali-
ties is more a matter of social preferences than of 
individual beliefs. More work is needed to explain the 
formation of trust among countries.
Next, we turn to disaggregate data by country. This 
allows us to examine whether subjects discriminate 
among origins and if this is the case, which partners 
they discriminate against or in favour of. According 
to Figure 3, the French do not seem to discriminate 
among origins, choosing to trust in 40% of the cases, 
regardless of the partner’s place of residence. Mo-
roccans and Spanish seem to trust more or less de-
pending on the origin. 
Figure 2.
Share of subjects A who trusted players B.
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Table 1.
Ordered probit model to detect if some countries are more trustee than others.
a) -1 -2 -3
b) TRUSTSUM TRUSTSUM TRUSTSUM
log of Respondent’s age 0.965 0.965 0.965
[0.627] [0.627] [0.627]
Respondent is Female 0.143 0.143 0.143
[0.257] [0.257] [0.257]
Respondent is Catholic 0.242 0.242 0.242
[0.361] [0.361] [0.361]
Respondent is Muslim -0.124 -0.124 -0.124
[0.435] [0.435] [0.435]
Respondent resides in France -0.737* 0.178
[0.419] [0.388]
Respondent resides in Spain -0.914* -0.178
[0.534] [0.388]
Respondent resides in Morocco 0.737* 0.914*
[0.419] [0.534]
cut1:Constant 1857 2594 2772
c) [2.016] [2.048] [1.917]
cut2:Constant 2700 3.437* 3.614*
[2.023] [2.057] [1.925]
cut3:Constant 3.439* 4.175** 4.353**
[2.031] [2.066] [1.936]
Observations 90 90 90
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. TRUSTSUM takes values from 0 to 3 and 
is equal to the number of times each subject had trusted in total.
Figure 3.
Share of subjets A who trusted players B, by country.
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To determine whether these differences are 
significant, we performed Cochran tests to check 
whether the probability that subjects from country 
A trust a partner from country B is the same for all 
countries B.7 If the p-value of the Cochran’s test is 
larger than 0.1, we would reject the hypothesis that 
subjects from country A discriminate among part-
ners’ origins. When we found some evidence that 
partner B’scountry of residence matters for subjects 
from country A, we performed McNemar’s test for 
each pair of partners to determine if the probability 
of trusting people from countries B1 and B2 is the 
same (we accept this hypothesis when the p-value 
is larger than 0.1). When the results of the Cochran’s 
test do not indicate any differences among partners, 
there is no point in performing McNemar’s test as 
it would obviously confirm that the probabilities of 
trusting within pairs are the same. The results are 
displayed in Table 2. 
The results of the Cochran tests indicate that 
only Moroccan players significantly discriminate ac-
cording to their partners’ origin (p-value = 0.0787). 
Moroccan players A trust Spanish players B less 
than they trust the French and Moroccan players, 
as illustrated in Figure 3. According to the results of 
McNemar’s test, the difference in Moroccan trust-
ing behaviour is only significant among French and 
Spanish partners (see Table 2). French and Span-
ish subjects exhibit similar levels of trust regardless 
of the nationality of players B (p-values of Cochran 
tests are 0.7408 and 0.1653, respectively). The re-
sults are in line with Figure 3 for French subjects: 
40% of them trust to some extent regardless of their 
partners’ country. The results are more surprising 
for Spanish players, since Spanish players A seem 
to trust Moroccan players B less than the French 
players (27% versus 47%). 
A corollary of these results is that subjects do not 
show a higher level of trust towards participants from 
their own country than towards participants from 
abroad. France is the country in which subjects trust 
the most.
To complete the preceding analysis of bilateral re-
lationships, we estimated three panel probit models 
to explain the trusting behaviour towards each of the 
three countries. The dependent variable (TRuSTiB) 
has a bilateral dimension: it takes the value 1 when 
subject ifrom country A trusts the partner from coun-
try B and 0 if he/she doesn’t. We then end up with 
270 observations corresponding to 30 subjects for 
each of the 3 countries A, who chose 3 times to trust 
or not depending on partner B’s country.8 We con-
sider a model with fixed effects by individuals since 
the available individual characteristics do not have a 
significant impact. Model 1 focuses on the behaviour 
of Moroccan subjects (A) by including two dummies 
reflecting the nationality of subjects (B), while the 
third possible nationality is omitted.9 Models 2 and 
3 focus on the trusting behaviour of Spanish and 
French subjects, respectively.10 The results are dis-
played in Table 3.
Our results confirm that subjects from Morocco 
trust the French more than the Spanish. The estima-
tions do not provide evidence of any other specificity 
nor positive or negative discrimination in any other 
bilateral relationships.
Result 2:	Intra-national	trust	levels	do	not	differ	from	
inter-national trust levels. Additionally, Mo-
roccan subjects display a higher level of trust 
towards French subjects than Spanish ones. 
b) players b’s decisions: reciprocal behaviour
Figure 4 shows the percentage of players B who 
chose the egalitarian outcome in each country.11 As can 
be observed, on average, Moroccan players reciprocate 
most (62%), followed by the French (39%) and Span-
ish players (14%). These results suggest that there is a 
relationship between reciprocal and trusting behaviour. 
That is, the high (low) level of trusting shown by Moroc-
can (Spanish) players A, might be explained by the high 
(low) level of reciprocity exhibited by their compatriots in 
the role of players B. It seems that players A expect that 
their partner B will behave as they would have. 
Table 2.
Cochran and McNemartests of proportions among players A from each country towards players B.
cochran’s test
Respondent’s country A 
(Trust/No trust) Partners B from all countries
France chi2(2) = 0.60; p-value = 0.7408
Morocco chi2(2) = 5.08; p-value = 0.0787
Spain chi2(2) = 3.60, p-value = 0.1653
Mcnemar’s test
Partners B 
from:
France versus 
Morocco
France versus 
Spain
Morocco versus 
Spain
A from 
Morocco
chi2(1) = 0.89
p-value = 0.3458
chi2(1) = 5.40 
p-value = 0.0201
chi2(1) = 1.67 
p-value = 0.1967
McNemar’s test: The null hypothesis is that the probabilities that country 
trusts in country B1 and B2 are the same.
Cochran’s test: The null hypothesis is that the probabilities that country A 
trusts in all country B are the same.
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Table 3.
Probit models to detect possible bilateral discrimination in subjects A trusting.
(1) (2) (3)
TrusTib TrusTib TrusTib
A from Morocco, B from France 0.821**
[0.342]
A from Morocco, B from Morocco 0.447
[0.333]
A from Spain, B from Spain -0.271
[0.335]
A from Spain, B from Morocco -0.562
[0.343]
A from France, B from Morocco -0.090
[0.333]
A from France, B from France -0.182
[0.334]
Subject A from France or Spain -0.002 0.075 -0.015
[0.255] [0.253] [0.253]
Constant -0.270 -0.091 -0.089
[0.245] [0.243] [0.242]
Omitted dummy A from Morocco, B from Spain A from Spain, B from France A from France, B from Spain
Observations 270 270 270
Number of id 30 30 30
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Figure 4.
Share of subjects B who chose the reciprocal option.
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The econometric results displayed in Table 4 show 
two estimations concerning reciprocity. An ordered 
probit model is used to explain the number of times 
in which each respondent B has chosen the egalitar-
ian option. The difference between the two models 
comes from the omitted dummy variable: in the first 
case we omit the dummy that indicates the subject 
is from Morocco and in the second model we omit 
the dummies for Spanish subjects. The first estima-
tion demonstrates that the Spanish subjects are sig-
nificantly less reciprocal than the Moroccan subjects 
and that there are no differences between the French 
and Moroccan participants. The second estimation 
shows that the French and Moroccan subjects are 
significantly more reciprocal than the Spanish sub-
jects. This finding gives rise to our third result:
Result 3:	Spanish	subjects	are	significantly	less	trust-
worthy than subjects from the other countries. 
Now we turn to the analysis of bilateral relation-
ships. Figure 5 displays the results disaggregated by 
country. The general picture shows that players B do 
not discriminate and exhibit similar levels of reciproc-
ity regardless of the nationality of players A. The re-
sults of the Cochran tests displayed in Table 5 show 
no evidence of discrimination for any country pairs 
(p-value = 0.7165 for France; p-value = 0.3050 for 
Morocco; p-value = 0.1738 for Spain).
In order to seek possible bilateral discrimination 
depending on nationalities, we estimate three panel 
probit models in the same line as the models dis-
played in Table 3 for trusting relationships. Model 1 
focuses on the behaviour of Moroccan subjects (B) 
by including two dummies reflecting the national-
ity of subject (A), while the third possible nationality 
is omitted. In this case, the bilateral relationship “A 
from France, B from Morocco” is used as a bench-
mark, while the other nationalities are aggregated in 
a whole dummy that takes the value 1 if subjects B 
are from France or Spain. Models 2 and 3 focus on 
Spanish and French subjects B, respectively. Their 
behaviour towards France and Spain are compared 
to their behaviour towards Morocco, the omitted vari-
able in both cases. 
The results displayed in Table 6 confirm that 
there is no evidence of significant discrimination 
among subjects A from any country, neither B’s 
own country or the other country. Additionally, we 
find that the variable indicating that B comes from 
another country shows (model 1) that France and 
Spain are significantly less reciprocal than Moroc-
co. From model 2, the coefficient of this variable 
indicates that the French and Moroccans are sig-
nificantly more reciprocal than the Spanish, thus 
confirming again result 3.
Table 4.
Ordered probit model to detect if some countries are more trustworthy than others.
-7 -8 -9
RECIPSUM RECIPSUM RECIPSUM
log of Respondent’s age 0.244 0.244 0.244
[0.708] [0.708] [0.708]
Respondent is Female 0.144 0.144 0.144
[0.259] [0.259] [0.259]
Respondent is Catholic 0.381 0.381 0.381
[0.367] [0.367] [0.367]
Respondent is Muslim -0.067 -0.067 -0.067
[0.579] [0.579] [0.579]
Respondent resides in France -0.800 0.938**
[0.539] [0.379]
Respondent resides in Spain -1.739*** -0.938**
[0.657] [0.379]
Respondent resides in Morocco 1.739*** 0.800
[0.657] [0.539]
cut1:Constant 0.066 1805 0.866
[2.307] [2.194] [2.271]
cut2:Constant 0.457 2195 1257
[2.305] [2.196] [2.271]
cut3:Constant 0.885 2623 1685
[2.308] [2.201] [2.274]
Observations 90 90 90
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. RECIPSUM Takes values from 0 to 3 and is equal to the 
number of times each subject B had chosen the reciprocal option in total.
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Figure 5.
Share of subjects B who chose the reciprocal option, by country.
Table 5.
Cochran tests of proportions among players B.
cochran’s test
Partners A from:
Respondent’s country, B (reciprocal/Selfish)
All countries
France chi2(2) = .66; p-value = 0.7165
Morocco chi2(2) = 2.375; p-value = 0.3050
Spain chi2(2) 3.5; p-value = 0.1738
Note: Cochran’s test: The null hypothesis is that the probabilities that country B reciprocates to all country A are the same.
Table 6.
Probit models to detect possible bilateral discrimination in subjects B reciprocating.
-1 -2 -3
1 if subject B chose 
the egualitarian option
1 if subject B chose the 
egualitarian option
1 if subject B chose the 
egualitarian option
A from Spain, B from Morocco -0.468
[0.426]
A from Morocco, B from Morocco 0.317
[0.431]
A from Spain, B from Spain 0.690
[0.645]
A from France, B from Spain -0.515
[0.753]
A from Spain, B from France 0.283
[0.583]
A from France, B from France 0.283
[0.583]
B and A from other country -2.252*** 2.637*** 0.242
[0.694] [0.817] [0.738]
Constant 0.691 -2.637*** -1012
[0.520] [0.752] [0.659]
Omitted dummy A from France, B from Morocco A from Morocco, B from Spain A from Morocco, B from France
Observations 270 270 270
Number of id 90 90 90
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The null hypothesis is that the probabilities that country B reciprocates to country A1 or country 
A2 are the same.
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Result 4: Intra-national reciprocity levels do not dif-
fer from inter-national reciprocity levels. Ad-
ditionally, participants do not discriminate be-
tween foreign partners.
conclusions
Trust plays a crucial role in economic interactions. 
The importance of trust for a better economic outcome 
in a society has been emphasized by many authors, 
among them Arrow (1972), Fukuyama (1995), Put-
nam (1993), knack and keefer (1997) and La Porta 
et al. (1997). In this regard, a partner’s (initial) choice, 
as well as the decision about the volume of activity, 
depends largely on the extent to which the agent 
trusts a potential partner. In a global environment, 
national diversity may have a substantial impact on 
agents’ initial trust towards their partners. According 
to Verlegh and Steenkamp (1999), a product’s coun-
try of origin has a significant impact on the accept-
ance and success of products. They disentangle this 
complex consumer behaviour into cognitive, affective 
and normative aspects of the country of origin. In 
particular, the affective aspect includes symbolic and 
emotional associations with the country of origin. In 
turn, consumers relate the country of origin to status, 
identity, national pride and past experiences; aspects 
that are difficult to identify. Measuring trust in different 
nationalities may be a way of isolating this affective 
aspect of country of origin effect.
Morocco, Spain and France are countries with 
narrow trade relationships, intense and asymmetric 
migration flows and historical ties, but also strong 
economic divergences. Furthermore, despite their 
geographical proximity, the fact that they belong to 
different continents makes them an interesting case 
study due to their cultural differences. This article is 
the first experimental study that directly examines 
whether the trade relationship between Morocco and 
its two historical partners, Spain and France, is re-
flected in the levels of trust and reciprocity among 
them. In a trust-game experiment, in which partici-
pants only knew the country of residence of their part-
ner, we found that participants from Morocco exhib-
ited the highest level of trust and reciprocity, whereas 
participants from Spain exhibited the lowest levels. 
Moreover, we did not observe positive discrimination 
towards participants of one’s own country. Regarding 
bilateral relationships, we found that Moroccan sub-
jects display a higher level of trust towards French 
subjects than Spanish ones.
Our results are apparently contrary to those of the 
World Values Survey, according to which Moroccans 
trust less in people of another nationality, as com-
pared to the French and the Spanish. However, in the 
same survey, when the level of trust in the neighbour-
hood is analysed, a very different picture is obtained. 
Morocco obtains the highest ratio of respondents who 
trust completely. Since our experimental analysis 
concerns neighbour countries, this result could be in 
line with our findings. Contrary to the discriminated-
non-trusting minority hypothesis (Smith, 2010), Mo-
roccans´ stronger trust towards both the French and, 
especially, the non-reciprocal Spanish indicates that 
trust may be related more to the trustor´s idiosyncrat-
ic features than the actual trustworthiness of the trus-
tee. Of course, other explanations like pluralistic ig-
norance could be considered, but again there seems 
to be no particular reason why this should only affect 
Moroccan subjects. The reason why Moroccans may 
display a higher level of trust in their neighbours than 
the other two countries is challenging and points to 
an interesting line of research for the future. In par-
ticular, our study finds that personal characteristics 
are not relevant in explaining either the overall level 
of trust or the different behaviour by partners’ ori-
gin. This would indicate that trusting someone from 
another country is part of the social capital and not 
completely determined at an individual level. Hence, 
trust in different countries may not be explained by 
generalized trust (also called psychological, affective 
or social trust).
This study suggests that trusting behaviour might 
be mainly driven by two facts. On the one hand, the 
reciprocal behaviour of one’s own compatriots: in-
dividuals could expect that participants from other 
countries behave like they do. The high (low) level of 
reciprocity exhibited by Moroccan (Spanish) subjects 
could explain their high (low) level of trusting. Obvi-
ously, a sample of 30 individuals by role and by coun-
try could be considered a small sample, thus calling 
for a cautious interpretation of our findingsbut which 
nevertheless points to an interesting line of research 
for the future.
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notes
1. According to the individualism index, Morocco, in com-
parison with Spain and France, is considered the most 
collectivistic society. For more details, see the link: 
https://geert-hofstede.com
2. The specific question in the WVS was framed in the 
following way: “I‘d like to ask you how much you trust 
people from various groups. Could you tell me for each 
whether you trust people from this group completely, 
somewhat, not very much or not at all? (Read out and 
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code one answer for each): People of another nation-
ality”. In Wave 5 (2005-2009), the number of respond-
ents in these three countries were: 1001 in France, 
1200 in Morocco and 1200 in Spain.
3. In this meta-analysis, Johnson and Mislin (2011) ex-
amined fifteen trust games run in Sub-Saharan African 
countries: Cameroon, kenya, South Africa, Tanzania 
and uganda.
4. Instructions were written in French for the experiment 
run in Morocco and France and in Spanish for the ex-
periment run in Spain. One of the co-authors of this 
article is completely bilingual in these two languages 
and she controlled for potential undesirable language 
effects. In addition, a colleague from the university of 
Rabat also checked that the French version was ready 
to be used with no language effects for the Moroccan 
subjects.
5. This share is calculated as the number of trusting 
choices made by the 30 subjects of each country over 
the 90 choices they made (each subject made 3 choic-
es, one for each country).
6. The significance of the differences between the three 
countries is not directly testable since each group in-
cludes three different answers for each subject.
7. Cochran’s Q test is accurate to evaluate hypotheses 
about the distribution of data in two or more dependent 
populations when data are categorical. McNemar’stest 
is used to determine if distributions of categorical data 
in two dependent samples are the same (see, for in-
stance, Sheskin 2003).
8. Alternatively, three estimations could have been run in-
dependently for each subject A partner but the selected 
method allows us to take into account not only the be-
haviour of each country towards its partners in general, 
but also pair-wise specificities. 
9. In this case, the bilateral relationship “A from Morocco, 
B from Spain” is used as a benchmark, while the other 
nationalities are aggregated in a whole dummy that 
takes the value 1 if the subjects B are from France or 
Spain.
10. Their behaviour towards France and Spain are com-
pared to the omitted cases “A from Spain, B from 
France” and “A from France, B from Spain”, respec-
tively.
11. This share is calculated as the number of reciprocat-
ing choices made by the 30 subjects of each country 
over the 90 choices they made (each subject made 3 
choices, one for each country).
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appendix i: instructions of the experiment 
(The instructions reported below are for players A. The in-
structions were slightly modified for players B)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will get 
3 euros at the end of the experiment just for participating. This 
experiment involves students from three universities: the uni-
versity of Granada (Spain), the university of Paris (France) 
and the university of Rabat (Morocco). Please read the follow-
ing instructions carefully so you can earn a higher amount of 
money. Please raise your hand if you have any questions. You 
may ask questions at any time during the experiment. With 
the exception of these questions, any communication between 
players is prohibited. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, 
you have been assigned a code at random. Please use the 
code at all times during the experiment.
Your code as a participant is: ____ 
Your earnings in this experiment depend on your decisions 
and the decisions of the other participants. You will receive 
the money you earned during the experiment in private and in 
cash within a week. Please keep your code, you will need it to 
collect your winnings. Without your code we cannot pay you.
This experiment consists of three tasks and your earnings 
in the experiment will be determined on the basis of these 
three tasks (randomly chosen). In each of the tasks you will be 
randomly matched to another participant. Your earnings de-
pend both on the decisions you make and the decisions made 
bythe other participant with whom you will be matched. 
You have been randomly and anonymously matched with 
another participant (called participant B).
As Participant A, you must choose between alternatives x 
or Y.
If you choose option x, you and participant B willreceive a 
payment of 10 ECu each and participant B does not have to 
make a decision.
If you choose a payment option, what you receive will de-
pend on participant B’s decision. Participant B chooses be-
tween options 1 and 2: 
• Option 1: 15 ECu for participant A and 15 ECu for 
participant B.
• Option 2: 8 ECu for participant A and 22 ECu for par-
ticipant B.
The exchange rate is 1 ECu = € 1.
To ensure that you understand these instructions before 
you make any decisions,please answer a simple question-
naire.You will be allowed to participate in the experiment only 
if you answer the questions correctly.
The participant B for this task is a student at the university 
of Rabat (Morocco). He or she also knows which university you 
are attending.
Please circle the alternative you choose: Alternative x Al-
ternative Y
Final Questionnaire
Age:_______
Sex (male/female):__________
Studies:___________________
Religion: Catholic___ Muslim___  Jewish___ 
 Non-religious ___  Other__________
Nationality:____________________
With respect to the tasks, we kindly ask you to answer the 
following question: Which university would you have liked 
player B to attend? 
Options: Paris (France), Rabat (Morocco), Granada (Spain).
 Please rank your preferences:
  1.________________
  2.________________
  3.________________
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appendix ii: composition of the sample
age
country of residence of participants
Total
France Morocco spain
18 10 0 8 18
19 4 1 12 17
20 7 19 17 43
21 8 20 13 41
22 3 18 0 21
23 8 2 7 17
24 4 0 0 4
25 3 0 1 4
26 1 0 0 1
27 1 0 0 1
28 3 0 0 3
29 1 0 1 2
33 0 0 1 1
35 1 0 0 1
38 1 0 0 1
46 1 0 0 1
56 1 0 0 1
57 1 0 0 1
58 1 0 0 1
61 1 0 0 1
Total 60 60 60 180
years of education after 
undergraduate
country of residence of participants
Total
France Morocco Spain
0 4 0 0 4
1 14 0 24 38
2 9 3 9 21
3 7 43 20 70
4 12 11 7 30
5 8 0 0 8
6 3 0 0 3
8 1 0 0 1
. 2 3 0 5
Total 60 60 60 180
religion
country of residence of participants
Total
France Morocco Spain
Catholic 15 0 44 59
Muslim 14 59 0 73
Jewish 3 0 0 3
Non-religious 26 1 15 42
Orthodox 2 0 1 3
Total 60 60 60 180
gender
country of residence of participants
Total
France Morocco spain
Male 28 38 27 93
Female 32 22 33 87
Total 60 60 60 180
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